Abstract. Network structures play a fundamental role in the modern economy. Examples vary from communication and transportation networks to supply chains and intermediation activities. Despite the economic relevance of these markets, the theoretical literature lacks an adequate framework to study price competition in these complex environments. In this paper we attempt to fill this gap by proposing a model of imperfect price competition in networks. Our approach maps traditional concepts of market demand, market power and double marginalization into networks. We make three main contributions. First, we show the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium price for a general class of networks. We characterize equilibrium profits in terms of the Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. Second, we develop several comparative statics results which highlight the role of the network topology. Finally, we show that, contrary to traditional wisdom, vertical integration in networked markets may lead to a reduction in social welfare and outcomes that are not Pareto superior.
Introduction
Network structures play a fundamental role in the modern economy. Examples include communication and transportation networks, intermediation and brokerage activities, international trade, and supply chains. In all of these examples, the way that firms compete on prices and how consumers make consumption decisions are determined by the shape of the network.
To fix ideas, consider the network in Fig. 1 which represents an intermediation network. Assume that at node s there is a seller who wants to sell a good to a population of buyers located at node t. Links f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , and f 4 represent firms. These firms provide the service of transporting the good from node s to node t. Each firm sets a price. A collection of firms connecting s and t is a path in the network. For this particular case the available paths are f 1 , (f 2 , f 3 ), and (f 2 , f 4 ) respectively. Given the prices posted by firms, the seller wants to send the good from node s to node t at the minimum cost. In other words, the seller wants to minimize the transportation cost. In doing so, the seller can send the good to node t using firm f 1 , or alternatively, he can send the good using path (f 2 , f 3 ) or (f 2 , f 4 ) respectively.
Despite its simplicity, the previous example highlights two fundamental properties common to all networked markets. The first property is the node effect, which captures competition amongst firms at the node level. In particular, at the node level each firm selling a good (or providing a service) competes with the other firms which offer substitute goods. For example in Fig. 1 at nodes s and i 1 firms f 1 , f 2 and f 3 , f 4 are substitutes respectively. Thus in economic terms the node effect captures horizontal competition among firms.
The second property is the path effect, which captures the fact that firms in the same path are complementary goods. In other words, paths in a networked market may be seen as bundles of complementary goods. For instance in Fig. 1 firms f 2 and f 3 are complements. In order to reach node t, f 2 needs f 3 as an intermediary in the path, and similarly f 3 needs f 2 as an intermediary. Otherwise neither firm f 2 nor f 3 could make positive profits. The economic implication of the path effect is that in setting prices firms must also consider the prices set by other firms in the same path. In other words, the path effect captures vertical competition amongst firms.
The node and path effects allow us to understand a fundamental difference with standard models studying price competition: In networked markets price competition has a vertical and horizontal dimension Recognizing the natural tension that the node and path effects introduce into the analysis, three fundamental questions arise.
1. Under which conditions does an equilibrium price exist? and Is this equilibrium unique ? 2. How do we carry out comparative statics exercises in networked markets? 3. How does vertical integration affect social welfare? 2 Despite the relevance of previous questions the theoretical literature on price competition in networks lacks an adequate framework to address these questions.
In this paper we make an attempt to fill this gap developing a model of imperfect price competition in networks. Our model considers a directed network with source 1 From a strategic point of view the node effect is equivalent to say that firms' prices are strategic complements, and the path effect is equivalent to say that firms' prices are strategic substitutes.
2 In a networked market vertical integration corresponds to a situation where firms in the same path coordinate their pricing decisions.
and sink nodes denoted by s and t respectively. Between s and t there is a series of intermediate nodes which represent different economic (or geographic) sectors. These intermediate nodes are connected by links which represent firms producing goods. A path is a collection of links connecting s and t. Economic sectors (nodes) and firms (links) define a networked market. We assume that there is a population of infinitesimal consumers who want to buy one of the paths connecting the nodes s and t.
Firms and consumers interact in a two stage pricing game as follows: First, firms set prices in order to maximize profits. Second, given these posted prices, consumers choose the path that maximize their utility. We solve this game using backward induction.
In modeling consumers behavior we depart from previous contributions in two important aspects. First, we use random utility theory to allow for heterogeneity in consumers' behavior, i.e., instead of assuming homogenous consumers we model the utility of choosing a certain path as a random variable. This heterogeneity allows us to introduce imperfect price competition in the context of networks. Second, instead of assuming that consumers choose the optimal path at node s, we assume that consumers construct the optimal path in a recursive fashion. In particular, consumers solve a dynamic programming problem over the graph.
Despite being a highly stylized model, our approach allows us to map the traditional concepts of market demand, market power, and double marginalization into networks.
1.1. Our contribution. We make the following contributions. First, we exploit our recursive discrete choice model to show how the market demand is shaped by node centrality. Formally, we show how the degree of centrality of economic sectors (nodes), captured by the Katz-Bonacich measure 3 , determines the shape of the market demand. A direct consequence of this characterization is that firms' profits may be written as a function of the network topology. As far as we know, this characterization is new in the literature of price competition in networks.
Second, we establish the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium price. Our result relies on the assumption that the random components in consumers' utility are independent. We assume that the distribution and the tail distribution 4 of these random variables are log-concave, which turn out to be a standard assumption in economics
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. In addition, we characterize the equilibrium prices in terms of the network topology, showing how vertical and horizontal competition interact.
Our third contribution provides one of the first analysis of comparative statics in the context of networked markets. We show how exogenous parametric changes at the node level propagate to the whole network affecting prices and equilibrium profits. This result emphasizes how exogenous changes at the node level can have global effects.
Fourth, we provide an analysis of vertical integration in networks. We show that, contrary to traditional wisdom, vertical integration in networked markets may lead to a reduction in social welfare and outcomes that are not Pareto superior.
Finally, we show how our framework can accommodate analysis of multi-product firms and price competition in networks. In the context of networked markets, our analysis of multi-product pricing is new.
1.2. Related literature. Our paper is related to the economic literature of price competition and intermediation in networks. In the context of intermediation, the paper by Nava [2014] studies Cournot competition and provides an analysis of efficiency as the network gets large. Using a second price auction, Katowski and Leister [2014] study equilibrium and stable networks, They focus on the analysis of free entry and its effects in terms of social welfare. A bargaining approach to the analysis of intermediation is proposed by Manea [2014] . In particular, Manea [2014] introduces a stationary bargaining model based on the notion of Markov perfect equilibrium. However, none of these papers study price competition, so their analysis and results may be seen as complementary to ours. 4 We recall that if for the random variable X its distribution is F (x), then its tail distribution is defined asF (x) = 1 − F (x).
See Bagnoli and Bergstrom [2005] for a discussion of the assumption of log-concavity density and distributions in economics.
In the context of price competition, the closest paper to our work is the recent contribution by Choi et al. [2014] . However, their results and approach differ from ours in at least three dimensions. First, we provide a different framework. In particular, they study homogeneous Bertrand competition in the context of networked markets, whereas we develop a framework which allows for heterogeneous consumers. Second, Choi et al. [2014] do not show uniqueness of a price equilibrium, which implies extreme results in terms of firms and consumers' surplus. Similarly, as a consequence of the multiplicity problem, they do not provide comparative statics results. Finally, Choi et al. [2014] do not characterize the effects of vertical integration in networks 6 .
From a technical point of view, our paper is related to the recent contribution by Quint [2014] . In particular, we extend Quint [2014] 's demand result,which establishes that the demand for each firm is log-concave in price, and is log super-modular in own and another product's price. However, his result only cover the case of parallel serial link networks. We show that our approach allows us to extend his result to a general class of networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduce our model of price competition, establishing several properties of the market demand. Section 3 presents our existence and uniqueness result. Section 4 discusses the comparative statics and section 5 study the effects of vertical integration. Section 6 extends our analysis to the case of multi-product firms. Finally, section 6 concludes. Proofs and technical lemmas are relegated to the appendix.
Price competition and Networks
2.1. Networks, firms, and consumers. In this paper we exploit the idea that a market may be represented by a network. Concretely, we represent a market by a directed acyclic graph G = (N, F ) , where N is the set of nodes and F the set of links respectively. We identify the set of nodes N as different economic (geographic) sectors. Similarly, the set of links F is identified with the set of firms (producers) connecting sectors in this network. Without loss of generality, we assume that the graph G has a single source-sink pair, where s and t stand for the source (origin) and sink (destination) node respectively. Let F + i be the set of firms connecting node 6 A more detailed discussion about the relevant literature related to our approach is described in section 2.
i with downstream nodes. Similarly, let F − i be the set of links connecting node i with upstream nodes. We assume that at each node i = t there is a continuum of costumers denoted by g i ≥ 0 for all i = s, t and g s > 0. The population of customers is summarized in the vector g = (g i ) i =t . We denote as a path a collection of links connecting s with t. The set of all paths is denoted by R, and the set of paths connecting node i with t is denoted by R i . In economic terms, a path may be seen as a bundle of goods produced by different firms. Thanks to this interpretation of a path, the links in a path may be seen as complementarity goods, and different paths may be seen as substitutes bundles 7 .
2.2. The pricing game. In this section we describe the pricing game between firms and consumers. In doing that, we assume that at node s there exists an unitary mass of consumers who want to buy a path from this network. A positive parameter θ f denotes consumers' valuation for the good produced by firm f ∈ F . Let p f be the price set by firm f ∈ F , and let p = (p f ) f ∈F denote the price vector for the entire market. According to this we define the utility of a given path r as
with θ r = f ∈r θ f and p r = f ∈r p f respectively.
Consumers choose the path that maximizes their utility. In other words, consumers choose path r * iff r * ∈ arg max r∈R {u r }. The solution to this maximization problem generates the market demand, which is given by the non-negative vector
where D f (p) ≥ 0 denotes the demand for the good produced by firm f . In order to be feasible, for a given p the demand vector D(p) must satisfy the conservation constraints
(1)
The set of feasible demands is denoted by D.
7 We remark that our way of identifying nodes and links in the network has been applied in other settings. For instance the recent Macroeconomic literature of sectoral fluctuations and networks, nodes are identified with economic sectors and links with firms. For details we refer the reader to Acemoglu et al. [2012] .
Thus consumers problem may be written as
To introduce the firms into the model, we begin defining their marginal costs. In particular, we assume that firms have constant marginal costs, which is denoted as c f for firm f . The vector c = (c f ) f ∈F denotes the vector of marginal costs. Recalling that p f denotes the price set by firm f , the profit functions are given by:
We model the interaction between consumers and firms as a two stage game where the timing is the following:
Stage 1: Firms compete on prices playing a complete information pricing game. Given its opponents' prices, each firm f ∈ F sets p f in order to maximizes (3).
Stage 2: Consumers observe these posted prices and they choose the path that solves (2).
We use backward induction to solve this game.
Example 1. In this example we show how standard market structures may be interpreted in terms of our network representation. Competition between substitutes: Fig. 2a shows a market where firms produce substitutes goods. In this situation consumers want to buy one of the goods, either f 1 or f 2 , which is equivalent to say that consumers want to buy any of the paths of the network. This network exhibits only the node effect. Competition between complements: Fig. 2b represents the situations where producers are complementary monopolists which are organized in the market as a chain or path of firms. This network exhibits only the path effect. Example 2. In this example we consider a market which exhibits the node and path effect. For the network in Fig. 3 , the set of nodes and links are given by F = {f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 } and N = {s, i 1 , t} respectively. At node s firms f 1 and f 2 produce substitutes goods. The node i 1 represents an economic sector which is complementary with firm f 1 . At this node we have F
= {f 2 , f 3 } with firms f 2 and f 3 producing substitutes goods. Consumers want to buy a path from the set R = {(f 1 , f 3 ), (f 1 , f 4 ), f 2 }. This simple example captures the essence of a networked market 8 . Example 3. Network in Fig. 4 describes a situation where we have a chain of monopolists interacting with firms competing at the node level. The path (f 1 , f 3 ) represents a chain a monopolists competing with firm f 2 at node s. This means that a chain of monopolists competes with firm f 2 at the node level. Furthermore at nodes i 3 and i 4 firms f 6 and f 7 are local monopolists. Previous description makes explicit how our network representation captures very complex patterns of price competition. Figure 4 . A network considering chains of monopolists, local monopolists, and competition among substitutes 2.3. Discrete choice in networks. Previous section describes a situation where consumers are homogenous. In the context of networked markets this is a strong assumption. In fact, it is not hard to find examples where consumers may have heterogeneous valuations θ r for each path r ∈ R. In addition, assuming homogenous consumers is that the pricing game may have many equilibria 9 limiting the analysis of comparative statics and welfare analysis.
A second limitation of assuming homogeneous consumers are the extreme values that the equilibrium prices may take. For instance, it is possible to show that in a given equilibrium some firms make zero profit and other firms extract all the surplus from consumers
10
.
A natural way to overcome these problems is to introduce heterogeneity amongst consumers using ideas from the theory of random utility models (See Anderson et al. [1992] ). Formally, for each path r we assume that consumers are randomly drawn from a large population. According to this, the valuation for the path r ∈ R is given by the termθ r = θ r + r , where r is a absolutely continuous random variable with E( r ) = 0 and E(θ r ) = θ r . Thus for a given price vector p we get that the utilityũ r associated to each path may be defined as:
and the demand for path r is given by D r (p) = P(ũ r >ũ r , ∀r ∈ R).
Unfortunately, while tractable this approach is not suitable to study price competition in markets with a network structure. In particular, the independence assumption of the r is not appropriated to deal with overlapping paths.
To see this, let us consider the popular logit model in which the random variables r are assumed to be independent following a logistic distribution. For simplicity we assume that there are not firms involved, so prices do not play any role in our analysis
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. Then thanks to the logistic assumption, we get the following pathdemand functions e ur r ∈R e u r ∀r ∈ R.
Now applying the logit demand to the network in Fig. 1 with θ f 1 = 1 − δ, θ f 2 = 1, θ f 3 = θ f 4 = δ, and 1 > δ > 0, it is easy to see that the demand vector is ( ). In 9 Similarly, in the context of networked markets, equilibrium prices may not exists in pure strategy. For additional details we refer the reader to Babaioff et al. [2013] .
10 These results are proven in Choi et al. [2014] . 11 This example may be extended to the case of firms charging prices, but the analysis is more cumbersome and the conclusion does not change.
terms of links, the flow associated are
, and f 4 = 1 3
. However, because both paths using the link f 1 are identical, the assignment ( ) seems to be more natural. This latter outcome is obtained when we focus on a situation of link-choices rather than path choices. Applying the link-choice approach in Fig. 1 we get the following: At node s consumers choose between f 1 and f 2 which, roughly speaking, provides the same utility so that each link receives A second important limitation of using the random utility approach based on path-choices, is that for complex networks the set of path can be admittedly large. A typical example where the path-choice approach turns out to impracticable is when it is applied to study commuters decisions in transportation networks. Even in small transportation networks, the number of paths can be very large. A discrete choice model based on link-choices overcome this dimensionality in a natural way.
Recognizing the problems with the traditional random utility approach, in this paper we pursue the idea of seeing consumers choices as a recursive discrete choice process. Formally, for a given price vector, consumers find their optimal paths solving a dynamic programming problem over the graph, and we call the solution to this problem as the market demand.
2.4.
Recursive discrete choice in networks. In order to introduce our recursive approach, we begin defining the random utility for the good produced by each firm f . Given a price vector p, at each node i = t we define the random utility u f for link f as
with { f } f ∈F being a collection of absolutely continuous random variables with
, and density g f (·) for all f ∈ F . The random variable f represents the variability of the valuation θ f within consumers.
13 Let j f denote that node j has been reached using link f . It follows that the utility of a
13 We can also consider the case where the utilities of every link (firm) are deterministic and the variability within the population is captured by the distribution of tastes in regard each link, i.e., path r is given byũ r = f ∈rũ f , and therefore the optimal utilityτ i = max r∈R iũ r and the utilityṽ f =ũ f +τ ja of link f become random variablesτ i = τ i + ε i and
. We interpret the model as a situation in which consumers reaching node i = d, observes the variablesṽ f and then they choose the link f ∈ F + i with the highest utility. This process is repeated at each subsequent node yielding a recursive discrete choice model. Mathematically, this recursive process induces a Markov chain over the graph G, where the transition probabilities are given by
for i = d and P tt = 1 and P ti = 0 for all i = t, i.e, the sink t is an absorbing state. Thus the path-choice rule is replaced by a recursive discrete choice model where the expected flow x i entering at node i = t (towards sink t) splits among the links f ∈ F
LetP = (P ij ) i,j =t denote the restriction to the set of nodes N \{t}, and g = (g i ) i =t . Then the expected demand vector x = (x i ) i =t may be expressed as x = g+P T x which generates the following stochastic conservation flow equations (6)
Previous model may be stated as a dynamic programming problem over the graph G. This formulation has the advantage of highlighting the economic content of our demand model. We note that the term v f may be rewritten as:
by the random variables f . For a detailed discussion about the interpretation of the variables f in the context of discrete choice models we refer the reader to Anderson et al. [1992] .
In the discrete choice literature the function ϕ i (v) is known as the inclusive value of the set F + i , and in terms of the network G, we may see ϕ i (v) as the attractiveness of the node i. Using this interpretation, the deterministic utility v f , derived from the good produced by firm f , consists of two terms; the current utility u f plus the attractiveness of the node j f which is possible to reach choosing link f . This simple property allows us to connect the network G with consumers' utilities.
Using a well known result in discrete choice theory 15 , equations (5)- (6) may be expressed in terms of the gradient of the function ϕ i (·). In particular, the conservation flow equations (5) and (6) may be rewritten as
2.5. Applications. Before discussing the general properties of our recursive model, we discuss several applications. In all of these examples our recursive approach applies.
2.5.1. Assembly networks in supply chains. In the context of supply chains, many products are composed of components and parts that travel through multiple vertically arranged industrial sectors. The different parts or components are combined by assemblers (retailers) who sell the final product to final buyers. The interaction between individual supplier of components is complex having a vertical and horizontal dimension. A natural way of capturing the process of assembly and the complex interaction amongst suppliers is using a network representation. Nodes represent industrial sectors and the paths represent the different way of combining components produced by the suppliers. Suppliers post prices, and then assemblers look for the combination that maximize their utilities. In this setting our recursive approach allows to introduce in a natural fashion the idea that assemblers find the optimal combination of components through a recursive discrete choice model.
In the literature of operations and management the articles by Carr and Karmarkar [2008] , Granot and Yin [2008] , Jiang and Wang [2010] , and Lovejoy [2010] are examples of papers studying the assembly problem. All of these papers use very different approaches varying from sequential Cournot competition (Carr and Karmarkar [2008] ) to Nash bargaining (Lovejoy [2010] ). Recently in economics the problem of assembly has been analyzed from a market design perspective. For detail about this approach we refer the reader to Kominers and Weyl [2011] and Kominers and Weyl [2012] and the references therein.
Freight shipping industries.
Another example is the freight shipping industry, in which point to point routes involve different carriers each one serving different geographical zones. In particular, in this setting we have that at node s a set of producers/users want to ship their products to a common destination captured by the sink node t. Links represent parts of the routes owned by different carriers, and nodes represent intermediate geographic zones. Given the prices set by the carriers, producers choose the paths that minimize their costs. In this setting, producers choose the optimal path connecting the sink and source nodes in a recursive way.
2.5.3. Hiring a team. Suppose that a manager wants to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task. The agents have different skills which are complementary, so the manager has many possible ways to hire different teams. The manager wants to perform the task at minimum cost whereas agents want to maximize their wages as a member of a team. In terms of our network framework, the set of different teams may be seen as different paths in a network with a single origin s and a single destination t. The nodes represent clusters of agents with specific skills and the links represent agents. Then the agents post their wages and the manager chooses the path with the minimum cost. A real world example that fits into this framework is the situation when a government wants to hire a team of engineers and scientists to develop a new public project. The different ways of combining the available engineers may be represented as paths of a network and the nodes represent clusters of different types of engineers and scientists. Engineers and scientists post their wages and the government chooses the path that minimizes the total cost of the public project.
The way that the government chooses the optimal path may be seen as a recursive discrete choice problem.
It is worth mentioning that in the context of algorithmic game theory, the problem of buying a path in a given network is known as path auctions. This literature focuses on the properties of truthful mechanisms (See Archer and Tardos [2002] , Elkind et al. [2004] , Czumaj and Ronen [2002] , and Karlin et al. [2005] ), and in the properties of different auction formats (See Immorlica et al. [2005] ).
2.5.4.
Corruption. An interesting application of our framework is to the study of corruption. In particular, assume that at node s a population of users want to reach the destination t. Nodes of the network may represent different geographic zones, or different hierarchical levels in an organization. According to this, we see the links as officials who ask users for a bribe in order to authorize their transit in the network. Olken and Barron [2009] use a similar description to study corruption in a transportation network in Indonesia. In particular, they assume that the corruption process may be seen as a chain of vertical monopolies. Our approach has the advantage of providing a way to incorporate market power and double marginalization ( Shleifer and Vishny [1993] and Ades and Tella [1999] ) to the study of corruption. In addition, our framework allows us to compare how corruption affects social welfare depending on the shape of the network.
2.5.5. Patent pool. In order to see how our framework is useful to study the problem of patent pool, we need to identify links and nodes as follows. Each node i =, s, t represents a different technological sector, and the set of links in F + i represents firms, which own patents (licenses). The different set of paths connecting s and t are identified as combination of patents in order to satisfy a certain technological standard. Given the prices set by patent owners, users at node s choose in a recursive fashion the standard that maximize their utility.
Previous description provides a general framework to the analysis of patent pools. One of the advantages of previous description is that incorporate in a natural fashion the concept of essential patents which in terms of network topology means the set of links that belongs to all paths. Similarly, our network representation allows us to understand the role of complements and substitutes patents from a graph theoretic perspective. Summarizing, previous representation may be seen as a network version of the patent pool model introduced by Lerner and Tirole [2004] .
2.6. Market demand: Network centrality and super modularity. In this section we formalize the main properties of our market demand. Our first task is to show that given an price vector p the demand vector D(p) exists and is unique. According to this, we introduce the notion of Markovian assignment over a network G Intuitively, Definition 1 may be seen as the fact that for each price vector p a Markovian assignment uniquely determines the demand system describing how consumers choose paths in the graph.
An important consequence of the recursive structure is that allows us to characterize a Markovian assignment in terms of the degree of centrality of different nodes in the network. Concretely, we can characterize D(p) in terms of Katz-Bonacich centrality measure. Following to Katz [1953] and Bonacich [1987] , we have the following definition.
Definition 2. Given w ∈ R n + , an n−square identity matrix I, and a parameter φ ≥ 0, the Katz-Bonacich vector of centralities relative to the weighted network G is:
Definition 2 states that the degree of centrality of a node is determined by the number of paths starting and ending on it. In terms of our model, Katz-Bonacich captures the relevance of an economic sector in the market.
Before stating the main result of this section, we define the matrixQ(v) = (Q if ) i =t,f ∈F as follows: 16 We point that an equilibrium notion called Markovian traffic equilibrium has been introduced in Baillon and Cominetti [2008] and extended to oligopoly pricing under congestion effects in Melo [2014] . However, neither Baillon and Cominetti [2008] nor Melo [2014] analyze the problem that is studied in this paper.
0 otherwise We are ready to state the following result Proposition 1. Let p be a given price vector. Then there exists a unique Markovian assignment, which is given by:
Some remarks are in order. First, Proposition establishes that for a given p the Markovian assignment is unique, which guarantees that the market demand is well defined. This result does not require independence of the random variables f . Second, our result shows how the network topology determines the market demand. Intuitively, expression (10) states how the centrality of economic sectors, measured by the Katz-Bonacich measure, determines the levels of demand. Thus nodes with higher degrees of centrality in the network are expected to receive a larger amount of flow. This simple property will play a critical role in our comparative statics exercises.
Super modularity of D(p).
Given the existence and uniqueness of a Markovian assignment, our next goal is to look for super modularity properties of D(p). Once again the recursive property of the demand model plays a crucial role in simplifying the analysis. In particular, we study the super modularity of D(p) at the node level. In order to make progress in this direction we need to assume the following Assumption 1 (Log-concavity). For all f ∈ F , assume G f has full support. Furthermore, G f and (1 − G f ) are log-concave.
Assumption 2 (Independence). The collection of random variables { f } f ∈F are independent.
Assumption 1 is a standard regularity condition, and most of the random variables used in economics satisfy it
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. The condition of full support is a technical requirement, which allows us to deal with interior best-responses and unique equilibrium.
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17 For a survey of log-concavity in economics we refer the reader to Bagnoli and Bergstrom [2005] . 18 The full support condition allows us to disregard situations of no trade equilibrium.
Regarding assumption 2, we note that the it rules out the possibility that the random variables f in the same path may exhibit dependence. In terms of our model, assumption 2 implies that realizations of f do not affect ϕ j f . However, we recall that even though the f are independent, paths sharing common links will be dependent by construction.
Proposition 2. Suppose that assumptions 1-2 hold. Then for all f ∈ F , the demand function D f (p) is log-concave, continuous, differentiable, and has full support. Furthermore, at each node i = t, the demand function is log-supermodular in p f and p f with f, f ∈ F + i and f = f .
We point out that proposition 2 is an adapted version of Quint [2014] 's Theorem 1, which only applies to the case of parallel serial links networks. From a technical point of view, we adapt his result to characterize at each node i = t the super modularity of D f (p) for all f ∈ F + i . In other words, proposition 2 applies to a much general class of networked markets.
Price competition: Existence and uniqueness
Now we are ready to study the existence and uniqueness of a price equilibrium. We begin defining the Nash equilibrium for the pricing game.
) is a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if for all
where
Previous definition is just the traditional notion of Nash equilibrium in prices but taking into account that the market demand is generated at the first stage as the outcome of a recursive discrete choice model. In order to simplify our analysis, we will assume that at each node i = t, consumers have an outside option which consists of leaving the market without buying any of the available goods in F + i . We denote this outside option as "Out", and according to this we redefine the choice set asF
In defining the outside option we consider two aspects. First, and without loss of generality, we normalize the utility associated to the outside option to be equal to zero, i.e., u Out = 0. Second, in terms of the graph G we may interpret the outside option as a "dummy" link connecting node i = t with the sink t. For ease exposition we do not graph these links.
Formally the assumption is as follows
Assumption 3. At each node i = t, consumers have the option of leaving the market. We denote this outside option as Out, and the choice sets are redefined as
Our first result characterizes the aggregate profits at the node level in terms of the Katz-Bonacich measure. The aggregated profits at node i = t are defined as
and the aggregate profit vector is given by
be the markup matrix where
We are ready to state the following Proposition 3. Let assumption 3 hold and let p * be a Nash equilibrium for the pricing game. Then the equilibrium profits are given by:
Proposition 3 makes explicit the connection between network positions and profits at the node level. In particular, our result shows us how our model captures the property that nodes (economic sectors) with a higher degree of centrality, measured by Katz-Bonacich centrality, obtain higher profits. From an economic point of view, Proposition 3 formalizes the connection between the Katz-Bonacich measure and market power. For instance, if there exists a node j = t which is involved in all paths, expression (11) tells us that node j makes the highest profits in the network.
Finally, we remark that as far as we know, the characterization in proposition 3 is new in the literature of price competition in networks
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With this characterization in hand we are ready to state one of the main results of this paper. Theorem 1. Suppose that assumptions 1-3 hold. Then there exists a unique pure strategy price equilibrium p * . Furthermore, the equilibrium price vector p * satisfies:
Previous theorem states the existence and uniqueness of a price equilibrium for a very general class of networked markets. The proof of this result relies on the recursive structure of the market demand. Concretely, exploiting the Markovian nature of the market demand, we decompose the network pricing problem into a collection of pricing problems at the node level. Thus by a backward induction argument we may extend this fact to the entire network. Intuitively, the recursive structure of the discrete choice model helps us to deal with the tension that the node and path effects introduce in firms decisions.
It is worth remarking that theorem 1 extends previous results in the literature of pricing in networks in a significative way. In fact, the closest result to ours is the paper by Quint [2014] , which only applies to the particular case of parallel serial link networks.
Similarly, Theorem 1 shows how our approach overcomes the multiplicity of equilibria and extreme prices results in Choi et al. [2014] .
Finally, Theorem 1 may be seen as an extension of the classic results in Caplin and Nalebuff [1991] .
19 A recent attempt of characterizing firms payoffs in terms of their network positions is discussed in Choi et al. [2014] . The authors introduce the notion of critical node as a way of accounting for firms' network positions. Their notion is that a node is critical if it is contained in all the paths of the network.
An important feature of theorem 1 is that equilibrium prices are given by the traditional formula marginal cost c f plus markup µ f (p * ). The prices p * f 's capture the competition and market power at the node level. Furthermore, at each node i = t the equilibrium prices account for the effect of downstream sectors which are captured by the terms ϕ j f . In economic terms equilibrium prices incorporate the effect of vertical and horizontal competition. In other words, our characterization of equilibrium prices makes explicit the role of the node and path effects in determining the equilibrium price. This property will play a crucial role in our analysis of comparative in section 4.
Theorem 1 can be specialized to the particular case of networks satisfying the condition |F 
Comparative statics in networked markets
Comparative statics in networked markets are in general a challenging task. The fact that exogenous changes at the node level may propagate to the entire network makes hard to predict the effects of local changes in terms of prices and profits. The way that local changes may have global effects is determined by the interaction of the node and path effects.
In this section we show how our framework is useful to carry meaningful comparative statics. We focus on exogenous changes on c and θ. Formally, we study the effects of the following type of exogenous changes. Concretely, we fix a node i = s, t, and a firm f ∈F + i , and we ask:
What is the effect on prices and equilibrium of an exogenous change in firm f 's marginal cost.
Similarly, we ask about the effect on prices and profits of an exogenous change on θ f . We begin our analysis characterizing the comparative statics at the node level. Formally for a fixed node i we look at the effects of an exogenous parametric change in one of the downstream firms. According to this we get Intuitively, Proposition 4 shows how the effects of an exogenous change at node j f affects node i through the node and path effects. To see this, we first describe how the node effect works. When firms f 's marginal cost increases, the price p f increases as well. Because at node j f firms produce substitute goods, firms f 's competitors respond to this higher level of c f increasing their prices as well
20
. As a result the attractiveness of node j f , captured by the value of ϕ j f , decreases. Now, in order to see how the path effect works, we note that firm f at node i reacts to this lower level of ϕ j f reducing p f . The intuition is that firm f allows consumers to reach node j f which has a lower attractiveness for them. Then firm f reacts lowering its price in order to keep attractive the path including node j f . This simple intuition of how node and path effects interact combined with our recursive demand model allows us to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. Let G = (N, F ) be a market satisfying assumptions 1-3. Let p * be an equilibrium price. Fix a node i = s, t and a firm f ∈F + i . 1. Suppose that the the marginal cost c f increase. Then there exists a path (f 1 , . . . , f k ) in which prices p * f l and profits π f l (p * ) decrease for l = 1, . . . , k,
2. Suppose that for firm f , consumers' valuation θ f increases. Then there exists a path (f 1 , . . . , f k ) in which prices p * f l and profits π f l (p * ) increase for l = 1, . . . , k, where
Three remarks are in order. First, as far as we know our theorem 2 provides the first comparative statics result in the context of price competition in networks. In fact, the results in Quint [2014] are a particular case of theorem 2.
Second, part i) of our theorem 2 may be seen as extension of the notion of passthrough to networked markets. To see this, fix a node i = t and assume that the good produced by firm f ∈F + i is taxed in an amount of t > 0. This tax is equivalent to say that firm f 's marginal cost has increased in t, i.e. ∆c f = t. Using Theorem 2 we know that p f increases, which is just the standard passthrough effect of an increment of c f . However, Theorem 2 adds more to the story. The first observation is that t reduces the attractiveness of node i, which is equivalent to say that ϕ i decreases. This implies that consumers' value of buying paths including node i decreases. Because firms in the same path are strategic substitutes, upstream firms react lowering their equilibrium prices. Thus the passthrough effect at node i propagates to the whole network. To the best of our knowledge this effect is new in the literature of price competition
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.
Similarly part ii) captures the explicit interaction amongst firms in the same path when the attractiveness of a node increase. In particular, fixing a particular node i = s, t, and assuming that for a firm f ∈F + i , consumers' valuation θ f increases. For this case is possible to show that attractiveness of the node i increases. Then part ii) tell us that there exists a path connecting nodes i and s in which all firms in such a path increase their profits and prices.
Finally, we remark that the way how exogenous changes at the node level propagates to the entire network depends on the degree of centrality of the node where the change occurs. Concretely, we know that profits and demand are related in a direct way with the Katz-Bonacich measure. Examples 4 and 5 below discuss this fact. 21 We note that this effect does not occur in the case of parallel serial links. In fact, if the network has a parallel serial Example 4. A simple network that captures the intuition of our results is given in Figure 5 . To see this, suppose that c f 4 increases. This implies that the value of ϕ i 2 decreases. Because the origin s and node i 2 are connected by the paths (f 1 , f 5 ) and f 3 the change in c f 4 will affects these firms. In order to keep themselves in the optimal paths chosen by consumers, firms f 1 , f 4 , f 5 must reduce their prices. Thus, a higher level of c f 5 decreases the prices of all upstream firms. Similarly, the profits of firms f 3 decreases.
Figure 5. An exogenous increment in c f 4 increases the prices firms f 1 , f 4 and f 5 .
Example 5. Previous example shows how an exogenous change affect the entire network. This result is determined by the centrality of the node where the change occurs. Figure 6 displays a network where exogenously the level of ϕ i 5 increases. It is easy to see that this node has a high degree of centrality so that the change on ϕ i 5 effects the prices of the upstream firms f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , f 4 and f 6 . In addition, the change on ϕ i 5 effects the downstream firms f 8 , . . . , f 12 . In particular, the demand that firms f 8 , . . . , f 12 receive increase.
4.1. The effect of adding links. A fundamental comparative statics in the analysis of networked markets is about the effect of adding links. In the context of our framework, adding a new link connecting two nodes has the interpretation that these What is the effect on prices and profits of adding new links to the network ?
Intuitively, adding a link to node i = t increases its attractiveness ϕ i . This higher value of ϕ i accounts for the fact that at node i after adding a link, consumers have more options of combining goods from different nodes. Following the same logic applied in theorem 2 we can find a path in which each firm increases profits and prices. Next Proposition 5 formalizes this Proposition 5. Let G = (N, F ) be a market satisfying assumptions 1-3. Fix a node i = s, t and let p * be an equilibrium price. Suppose that the number of links inF
increase. Then there exists a path (f 1 , . . . , f k ) in which prices p * f l and profits π f l (p * )
increase for l = 1, . . . , k, where
The economic content of proposition 5 states that adding a link to a node i = s, t increases the prices and profits of the upstream firms. In fact, we are able to find a path connecting i and s in which all firms increase their profits and prices.
In terms of network topology, we do not need to assume specific conditions other than the graph is directed and acyclic. Thus proposition 5 applies to a large class of networked markets.
Example 6. Figure 7a shows a network which consists of two unconnected paths. In economic terms, Figure 7a means that the goods produced by firms f 1 , f 2 and f 3 , f 4 are incompatible. Suppose that firm f 5 enters the market producing a good which makes compatible firm f 1 with f 4 . The new network is depicted in Figure 7b . This new link increases the value of ϕ i 1 , which implies that firm f 1 increase prices and profits. The price set by firm f 3 decreases.
(b) Both paths are connected by f 5 Figure 7 . Firm f 5 makes possible that consumers can choose between f 2 and f 5 at node i 1 .
Vertical integration in networks
In the analysis of price competition models, a core question is about the effects that vertical integration of firms producing complementary goods may (or may not) have on prices and profits. In this section we shall show how our framework is suitable to carry out analysis of vertical integration.
We begin noting a simple economic fact captured by our model: Firms in the same path do not internalize the effect of their pricing decisions to downstream and upstream nodes. In particular, the prices set by firms along the same path suffer from the double marginalization problem which has been intensively studied in the literature of price competition. Intuitively, the double marginalization captures the vertical pricing externality generated by the fact that at each node firms set optimal prices taking as given the incoming flow (demand) from upstream nodes. Thus firms only consider the node effect when setting prices ignoring the fact that their pricing decision impact the upstream nodes through the path effect
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. In other words, the path effect generates the double marginalization and vertical pricing externality problems.
Since the seminal work by Cournot [1897] it is well known that vertical integration of firms of producing perfect complements implies lower prices for consumers and higher profits for the firms. In other words, once firms coordinate their pricing decisions, internalizing the vertical pricing externality, the final outcome for consumers and firms is a Pareto superior situation. Starting from Cournot's insight the natural question to ask is: Does Cournot's prediction hold in the context of networked markets?
In this section we shall see that our approach allows us to answer this question adding new insights. In order to gain some intuition about how our approach is useful to study the effects of vertical integration, we begin analyzing a very simple example.
5.1. A motivating example. Consider the network displayed in Figure 8 . For this market, let us assume that firm f 1 produces the main product, whereas firms f 3 and f 4 produce complements to this main good. Consumers may combine these goods in two ways; choosing (f 1 , f 3 ) or (f 1 , f 4 ). In addition, firm f 2 produces a substitute good for f 1 . According to assumption 3 at nodes s and i 1 there is an outside option denoted by Out. Then, starting at node s, consumers may buy good f 1 , f 2 or stay out of the market. Buying f 1 consumers reach node i 1 , where they can buy f 3 , f 4 or leave the market just with good f 1 . Summarizing, in this market consumers may choose any of the paths f 1 , f 2 , (f 1 , f 3 ) and (f 1 , f 4 ).
From Theorem 1, we know that at equilibrium p * takes the form
for k = 1, 2, 3.
22 A similar type of effect may be found in Rey and Stiglitz [1995] in the context of intrabrand and interbrand competition. Now suppose that firm f 1 and f 2 are vertically integrated, i.e., they maximize its joint profits coordinating their pricing decisions. Under this new scenario it is easy to show that the equilibrium prices vector p * * is given by
and
These new prices show how under vertical integration firm f 2 fully internalizes the externality generated on firm f 1 when setting prices. In order see the intuition of this result, we note that when p = c f 2 , the value of ϕ i 1 increases. Then invoking proposition 4, we know that an increment the attractiveness of node i 1 implies that p * * f 1 and π f 1 (p * * ) increase. In other words, under vertical integration firm f 1 makes all the profit whereas firm f 2 makes zero profit.
Previous insights differ from the canonical result that vertical integration is Pareto improving. We point out that for the case of consumers vertical integration increases consumers' surplus increases despite firm f 1 increases its equilibrium price. However, producer surplus, measured as the aggregate profit, not necessarily increase. As a matter of fact, after vertical integration firm f 1 is the only one making higher profits. All firms f 2 , f 3 , and f 4 make lower profits. Thus it is perfectly possible that the producers' surplus may decrease, and as consequence, the social welfare may decrease.
Summarizing, in the context of networked markets the effects of vertical integration differ in an important way from the ones obtained in classic Cournot's setting.
Double marginalization and vertical integration in networks.
In this section we show that the intuition derived in previous example extends to general networked markets. Our first result is the following Theorem 3. Let G = (N, F ) be a market satisfying assumptions 1-3. Suppose that firms in the path (f 1 , . . . , f k ) connecting s with t are vertically integrated. Then the equilibrium prices are given by:
Theorem 3 shows that under vertical integration the equilibrium prices take a specific form for the integrated firms. The main feature is that firm f 1 sets prices equal to marginal cost plus markup, whereas the rest of the firms set prices equal to marginal cost. This result is independent of the network topology. According to these prices, only firm f 1 makes positive profit. In terms of welfare, consumer surplus increases and the effect on producer surplus is ambiguous. This feature challenges the traditional wisdom that vertical integration among complements produces lower prices for consumers and higher profits for all the firms involved in the agreement.
Theorem 3 highlights how firms may exploit their network positions. In fact, in absence of vertical integration, firm f 1 can use its network position position to increase its profits. For instance, let us assume that entry is allowed at node j f 1 . Then firm f 1 may decide to enter at this node introducing a substitute good. This decision has two effects. First |F + j f 1 | increases, which by proposition 5 it follows that firm f 1 increases its profits. The second effect is that due to the fact that firm f 1 must coordinate its pricing decisions at node s and j a 1 . Thus firm f 1 set the price of this complementarity good equal to marginal cost. This latter observation is consistent with the behavior in markets like computer industry and digital goods, where the main good has a positive (and high) price, but many of its complements are given away for free or sold at prices equal to marginal cost.
To the best of our knowledge, the result and insights in derived from theorem 3 are new. The only paper with a similar result, but in a much simpler setting, is the work by Chen and Nalebuff [2007] . Their result is a particular case of ours.
We note that theorem 3 can be specialized to the situation where two consecutive firms in path integrate. The key property of this "local " integration is that its effect propagates to the rest of the network.
Proposition 6. Let G = (N, F ) be a networked market satisfying assumptions 1 -3. Let (f 1 , . . . , f k , ) be a path connecting s and t. Assume that firm f k−1 and f k integrate. Then : i) For firms f k and f k−1 , we get:
6. Price competition with multi-product firms
In previous sections we have identified with economic sectors (clusters) and links with goods produced by different firms. In this section we modify this assumption identifying each node i = t with an individual firm, and the links in F + i as the set of goods produced by this multi-product monopolist
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. This way of reinterpreting the model allows us to study price competition with local multi-product monopolists. In addition, we will assume that the random variables have a logistic distribution, which is equivalent to say that the demand of each good is given by the logit rule. Formally we get A direct consequence of previous assumption is that the attractiveness of node i = t is given by ϕ i (v) = log
With this assumption we are ready to establish the following Theorem 4. Let assumptions 3-4 hold. Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the pricing game. Furthermore, firms' equilibrium profits are given by expression (11).
Theorem 4 establishes the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the context of multi product firms competing in a network. This represents a significant generalization of the available results which do not study the case of networked markets.
An important consequence of assumption 4 is that allow us to write the equilibrium prices in a closed-form expression involving the Lambert W function (Corless et al. [1996] ). For any nonnegative z, W (z) is the solution w satisfying:
The function W is positive, increasing and concave in the interval of our interest. Thanks to this simple observation, we are able to provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium price vector p * .
Proposition 7. Let assumptions 3-4 hold. Then the unique equilibrium price vector satisfies:
Proposition 7 shows how equilibrium prices are a function of the network topology. To see this, we recall that ϕ j f (v) is the attractiveness of node j f which captures all the information about downstream firms. Now noting that the attractiveness of node j f is decreasing on prices, it follows that in (13) the prices p f and the prices of downstream firms are strategic substitutes.
From a numerical perspective the fact that prices are expressed in terms of Lambert W function, allows us to implement numerical and approximation techniques in order to compute the vector p * . For details about these techniques we refer the reader to Corless et al. [1996] .
6.1. Pass-through analysis. In this section we use proposition (7) to study passthrough in the context of networked markets. In doing that we need to introduce the following notation: For a fixed node i = t, we define the probabilities q f as follows:
We begin our analysis characterizing the pass-through at the node level.
Proposition 8. Let G = (N, F ) be a market satisfying assumptions 3-4. Then fix a node i = t and a firm f ∈F + i , and let p * be the unique equilibrium price. An increment of c f implies:
A few remarks are in order. First, when c f increases the price p f must increase. This is the standard logic in pass-through analysis. In order to compensate the increment in p f the monopolist must reduce the prices p f for f = f . These two effects imply that an increment in c f may have an ambiguous effect on ϕ i (v). Condition
guarantees that an increment in c f decreases the value of ϕ i . Second, the proof of proposition 8 relies on the explicit formula for the prices (7). Thanks to this closed-form expression the proofs follows from standard implicit differentiation.
With this result in hand, we are ready to see how the pass-through rate at a given node propagates to upstream nodes. Next result formalizes this fact.
Proposition 9. Let G = (N, F ) be a market satisfying assumptions 3-4. Let p * be an equilibrium price and fix a node i = s, t and a firm f ∈F , where f and i are the firm and node in the corresponding paths. ii) The effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous
We point out three features about proposition 9. The first observation is about the role of node centrality. In particular, when an exogenous change on c f occurs at node i = s then all paths connecting s and are affected. Because our notion of Katz-Bonacich centrality takes into account the paths connecting two nodes, then an exogenous change on c f at node i = s has a larger effect on the network when the node has a higher degree of centrality. Our second observation is related to the fact that when the marginal cost c f increases at node i, upstream firms must react decreasing their prices in order to compensate for the lower value of ϕ i . In other words, in order to keep attractive the set of paths containing node i, upstream firms must decrease their prices. Finally, we note that the condition in part ii) help us to guarantee that a change of c f at node i has clear effects. Without this condition, the comparative statics of a change in c f at node i has ambiguous effects.
Conclusions and future work
We presented a model of imperfect price competition in the context of networked markets. We have established three main results. First, we established the existence and uniqueness of a price equilibrium for a general class of networks. As far as we know, this result is new in the literature of pricing in networks. Furthermore, we show how the equilibrium prices and profits are determined by the network topology. Second, we show how our model is useful to carry out important comparative static exercises. As far as we know, our paper is the first deriving this class of results. Third, we provide an analysis of vertical integration in networked markets.
The framework presented in this paper may be used to implement empirical model of imperfect price competition in supply chains. An econometric exercise of this type is useful in order to simulate and understand the effects of policy intervention.
Appendix A. Proofs A.1. Market demand, existence and uniqueness.
A.1.1. Market Demand: Proof of Proposition 1: It is easy to see that we always can find a sequence of nodes 1 1 , . . . , i m with i 1 = i and i m = t and P i k i k+1 > 0. Then the Markov chain started at node i has a positive probability of reaching the sink t. This impliesP is strictly sub-Markovian for k large. Then the matrix I −P is invertible. Using this fact in (8) A.1.2. Existence and Uniqueness. In order to establish the existence and uniqueness of a equilibrium price p * , we begin analyzing the simplest case of a network consisting of a source node s and sink node t. The set of nodes is denoted by N = {s, t}. The nodes s and t are connected by a collection of firms denoted by F = {f 1 , . . . , f n , Out} and N = {s, t}. The networked market is the graph G = (N, F ). For this simple case we will state the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. In doing that we need a series of technical Lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let G = (N, F ) be a simple networked market. Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let the profit function given by log π f (p f , p −f ) = log(p f − c f ) + log D f (p f , p −f ) for all f ∈ F .
Then the pricing game among firms is a supermodular game indexed by c f for all f .
Proof. Thanks to Proposition 2, we know that D a is differentiable, so that the marginal profit function
is well defined. Furthermore, Proposition 2 implies that the marginal revenue function is increasing in p −f .Thus the conclusion that the pricing game is supermodular and indexed by c f follows at once.
Lemma 2. Consider a networked market consisting of just the nodes s and t, and a collection of parallel links F . Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then there exists a unique equilibrium price denoted by p * .
A.2. Comparative statics in networked markets. Similar to the case of the existence and uniqueness, we start analyzing the comparative statics of the simplest market consisting of a source s and a sink t connected by a set of firms F = {f 1 , . . . , f n , Out}. Notation. In establishing our results, we use the following notation. A change on firm f 's marginal cost is denoted by ∆c f , where an increment in c f is equivalent to ∆c f > 0 . Similarly, a change in consumer valuations' θ f is denoted by ∆θ f , where an increment in θ f is equivalent to ∆θ f > 0.
We begin with the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Let G = (N, F ) be a simple market. Suppose that assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then i) Suppose ∆c f > 0. Then ∆p f > 0 with ∆p f < ∆c f . Furthermore, ∆p f > ∆p f > 0 for all f = f . ii) Suppose ∆θ f > 0. Then ∆p f > 0 with ∆p f < ∆θ f . Furthermore, ∆p f < 0 for all f = f . iii) Suppose that |F | increases. Then prices for the existing components are lower.
the term
